The U.S. Supreme Court decided in Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. ___ (2013), that a sufficient Rule 68 Offer of Judgment issued to a lone plaintiff in an FLSA collective action prior conditional class certification and joinder of opt-in plaintiffs moots the entire claim – even if the plaintiff rejects the Offer.  The 5-4 opinion overruled the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, which held that such a mechanism frustrated the purpose of the FLSA’s collective action provision by allowing a defendant to “pick off” the named plaintiff prior to the conditional certification stage.

  
Procedural History

The underlying case involved a nurse suing for overtime violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., when her employer automatically deducted 30 minutes from her work day for a mandatory meal period even when she worked through it.  Symczyk sued on behalf of herself and all those similarly situated.  Concurrently with its answer, Genesis served a Rule 68 offer of judgment for $7,500 plus reasonable attorney’s fees, costs and expenses to be determined by the Court, an amount which fully satisfied Symczyk’s damages and included a reasonable attorney’s fee.  Plaintiff did not accept the offer during the prescribed 10-day time period, and a motion to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction followed.  The District Court granted the motion, holding that the employer’s offer of judgment fully satisfied plaintiff’s individual claim and thus mooted the lawsuit because no other class members had opted in. 
 
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed.  Symczyk v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 656 F. 3d 189 (3d Cir. 2011).  The appellate court agreed that plaintiff’s individual claim was moot, but not the collective action.  The Third Circuit held that calculated attempts to pick off named plaintiffs with Rule 68 offers of judgment before conditional certification could short circuit the process and thereby frustrate the goals of collective actions.  The case was remanded to permit Symczyk to seek conditional class certification, which would relate back to the date of filing of the Complaint for statute of limitations purposes.  

Supreme Court Opinion

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.  Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for the majority, held that straightforward “case or controversy” principles governed the Court’s decision.  Justice Thomas first addressed plaintiff’s argument that her individual claim was not moot because she did not accept the offer of judgment.  The majority held that plaintiff’s argument was not properly before the Court, as the Third Circuit affirmed the trial court on this point and no cross-petition to the Supreme Court was filed.  Accordingly, the only issue before the Court was whether the collective action survived in light of the lack of any remaining plaintiffs.  Distinguishing several decisions based on Federal Rule 23 class actions, the Court held that no individuals other than plaintiff had a stake in the litigation at the time of the offer of judgment.  The majority similarly rejected arguments relating to the purpose of the FLSA’s collective action provision.

Speaking for the minority, Justice Elena Kagan wrote a sarcastic but effective opinion, stepping through the door left open by the majority’s refusal to address the question of whether plaintiff’s refusal to accept the offer of judgment mooted her claim.  The dissent questioned how an unaccepted offer of judgment could be deemed a satisfied claim, especially since the plaintiff took nothing in the action. 
 
Impact

The key question following Symczyk is its scope.  Specifically, will it be read to apply only where the employee fails to argue that their individual claim is not moot?  In a footnote, Justice Thomas noted four appellate opinions that either declared the individual claims moot in similar circumstances or authorized lower courts to enter judgment for the plaintiff where an offer of judgment provided complete relief.  See Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F. 3d 337, 340 (3d Cir. 2004); Griese v. Household Bank (Ill.), N.A., 176 F. 3d 1012, 1015 (7th Cir. 1999); O’Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enters., Inc., 575 F. 3d 567, 575 (6th Cir. 2009); McCauley v. Trans Union, LLC, 402 F. 3d 340, 342 (2d Cir. 2005).  Symczyk’s impact in these circuits is significant.  In other circuits, the impact will largely depend on how each circuit resolves the mootness argument.  

If other circuits join the position that a sufficient offer of judgment moots an individual claim, Symczyk provides a strategic pawn in putative FLSA collective actions previously rejected by multiple courts.  Employers immediately could pick off the named plaintiff and thwart the collective action process, forcing the plaintiff’s attorney either to 1) accept an attorney’s fee on a single claim and move on; 2) attempt to locate a new named plaintiff to file a new suit against the employer; or 3) make a broader strategical adjustment, such as to file suit exclusively under state wage and hour laws which typically mirror the FLSA, and utilize state law class action procedures. 
 
Advising the Client

Employment attorneys should be cautious in advising their corporate clients about Symcyzk’s impact.  The majority’s failure to address whether Symcyzk’s individual claim was moot leaves lower courts free to address the individual mootness issue on pre-Symcyzk precedent.  Even if a motion to dismiss is successful, a fellow employee’s claim may follow close behind.   Still, there appears to be little downside serving a Rule 68 Offer of Judgment.  Of course, clients should be advised that if the offer is accepted, a judgment will be entered against it. 
 
Spencer Silverglate is the Managing Partner and co-founder of Clarke Silverglate, P.A., in Miami, Florida, with an active trial practice specializing in employment and commercial litigation.  Craig Salner is a Partner at Clarke Silverglate, also specializing in employment and commercial litigation.
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As was reported yesterday the plaintiffs in the 2011 landmark class action case Dukes v. Wal-Mart haven't given up and are now attempting to pursue regional class cases in federal courts in California, Tennessee, Texas, Florida and Wisconsin.  In an attempt to overcome the issues raised by the U.S. Supreme Court, counsel for the Wal-Mart plaintiffs contend the narrower, regional classes pass muster because they are geographically focused and allegedly identify specific store, district and regional practices that led to the alleged discriminatory practices.  Counsel for Wal-Mart contends the plaintiffs' class certification motion merely "recycles" arguments previously rejected by the high court, noting the remaining differences between the individual plaintiffs in each of the proposed classes.

Do these new regional classes meet the standards announced in Dukes v. Wal-Mart?  How have the plaintiffs overcome the conflicts present in the initial classe, such as including female managers and their female subordinates in the same class?

 

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On January 25, 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) lacked a sufficient quorum of members when it issued a finding that Noel Canning had violated the National Labor Relations Act.  See Noel Canning v. NLRB, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 1659 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013).  On the date that the NLRB issued its findings against Noel Canning, three of its five members were sitting after appointment by President Obama, without Senate confirmation, under the Recess Appointment Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  The problem, according to the court, was that the “recess appointees” had been appointed while the Senate was in pro forma session, not recess, thereby making the appointments invalid.  With only two validly appointed members sitting on the NLRB, the Court of Appeals held that the NLRB lacked the necessary quorum to take any action against Noel Canning.

The court’s ruling potentially invalidates all NLRB rulings since January 4, 2012, the date of the recess appointments.  And because two of the unconfirmed appointees continue to sit on the NLRB, all NLRB decisions going forward may be called into question.  The NLRB does not appear phased by the court’s ruling, however, and continues to issue decisions.  It is expected that the NLRB will continue with business as usual until the Supreme Court weighs in on the issue.

On February 13, 2013, President Obama asked the Senate to confirm his re-nomination of NLRB Members Sharon Block and Richard Griffin.  That same day, various Republican House of Representatives leaders sent a letter to President Obama and NLRB Chairman Mark Pearce, requesting that the President nominate “four qualified individuals” to the NLRB and that the NLRB cease all activity until confirmation of the requested appointments.  While each branch of the government weighs in on this issue, employers and their attorneys are left with the challenge of interpreting the current state of labor law.

We look forward to gaining insight on the recess appointee controversy, as well as the NLRB’s recent decisions and agendas, from Lafe Solomon, Acting General Counsel for the NLRB, during DRI’s 36th Annual Employment and Labor Law Seminar, to be held May 1-3, 2013, at the Arizona Biltmore, in Phoenix, Arizona.  If you have not already registered for this exciting event, please access the registration information here to secure your spot today.

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Do you talk or text while driving? If so, you better check out the status of the law in your state. Here are two links that will give you important information on these laws. And local governments are getting in on the act. For example, this Wednesday Mission, Kansas, begins the process of enacting an ordinance allowing only hands-free phones while driving.

 

 http://www.distraction.gov/content/get-the-facts/state-laws.html

 

http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfo/laws/cellphone_laws.html

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It is not uncommon for plaintiffs to argue - and for some defense lawyers to agree - that individual life, health, or disability insurance policies cannot be part of an employee welfare benefit plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. Section 1001, et seq. ("ERISA"). Not so. ERISA broadly provides that an employee welfare benefit plan can be funded "through the purchase of insurance or otherwise," 29 U.S.C. §1002(1), and makes no distinction between individual insurance and group insurance. Thus, benefits under an ERISA-compliant plan can be funded by one or more group or individual insurance policies, or a combination of group and individual insurance policies.

In the past year, there have been several federal district court decisions holding that programs involving individual disability insurance policies are governed by ERISA, even in some instances where the actual structure of the ERISA program expired before an insured filed a claim for benefits under the policy. This article will discuss two of those decisions - both in California - as illustrations of the types of arrangements involving individual insurance policies that courts have found to be regulated by ERISA.

Indicia of an ERISA Plan

The ultimate question in determining whether any insurance policy - individual or group - is regulated by ERISA, is whether the policy is part of an employment relationship. That necessarily requires the establishment of an employer-employee relationship, i.e., there must be an employer and at least one covered employee/participant. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §2510.3-3(b) and (c) (every ERISA plan must cover at least one common law employee). It also requires evidence that the insurance policy is part of the employment relationship.

In a typical group insurance arrangement, a group insurance policy is issued to an employer who determines that it will provide coverage to a select group of employees. The employer also typically contributes at least part of the cost of the employee's coverage and/or performs other functions or actions indicating that the employer endorses the program and/or has adopted the policies as part of its overall employee benefit program.

A typical program involving individual policies of insurance is not so different. Examples of some of the common practices involving individual insurance policies can include the following:

  • A multi-life program, sometimes exhibited in a written agreement between an employer and an insurer.
  • The employer selects the broker, the insurer, and sometimes the types of policies that will make up the program.
  • The employer may agree to accept certain responsibilities for establishing and/or maintaining the program, such as payment of all or a portion of the premiums.
  • Premiums are subject to a discount as a result of the agreement between the employer and the insurer.
  • There may be other benefits such as abbreviated underwriting procedures or higher coverage limits.
  • Billings are made directly to the employer, sometimes referred to as a "list bill."
  • Individual policies are issued to a select group of employees, many times including one or more owner/employees of the employing entity (frequently a professional corporation).
  • The employer maintains ongoing communication with the insurer, including administrative tasks such as informing the insurer when new employees are hired or existing employees are terminated.
  • The employer facilitates payment of the premiums. The actual financial responsibility for the premiums may occur in a number of ways, e.g., the employer may absorb the cost, the employer may pass on some or all of the cost to the employees (such as through payroll deductions or via a flexible benefits program), the employer may ask the employees to pay the premiums directly and may reimburse the employees through a bonus program, or the cost of the premiums may be deducted from various expense accounts available to the employees. Many times the purpose of passing on the costs to the employees is to ensure that any benefits would not be subject to income taxes.

Structure of an ERISA Plan

The structure of an ERISA welfare benefit plan is statutory and requires five elements: (a) a plan, fund, or program; (b) established or maintained; (c) by an employer (or an employee organization); (d) for the purpose of providing statutory benefits (including life, health, and disability insurance); (e) to participants and beneficiaries. 29 U.S.C. §1002(1). In the context of group or group-type insurance programs, courts also look to whether the program falls within the "safe harbor" regulation, which excludes any program from ERISA where the employer is a mere advertiser of the program. In order to satisfy the regulatory safe harbor, a plan must satisfy several elements. Two of these elements are most often in dispute when one is attempting to determine whether a plan is exempt from ERISA: (a) whether the employer contributes to the program; and (b) whether the employer has endorsed the program. Satisfaction of either of these elements removes a plan from the safe harbor exemption. 29 C.F.R. §2510.3-1(j).

Case Study: Zide v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins.

The employer in Zide v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153777 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2011) signed a salary allotment agreement with Provident Life & Accident Insurance Company whereby the employer represented that it would pay the entire premium cost in consideration for Provident to issue individual disability policies to select employees of a medical corporation, some of whom were also shareholders of the corporation. The salary allotment agreement was in effect for many years. During that time, various doctors were covered under the plan. Some of the doctors were employees when first covered, but later became shareholders. Premiums were billed via periodic list bills sent to the corporation and the corporation paid the premiums. The corporation then charged the premiums back to the various doctors. There was a substantial premium discount as well as other benefits which continued even if a doctor left the corporation and continued to pay the policy premiums. By the time Dr. Zide filed a claim for benefits under his policy, he was the only insured left at the corporation and he was the sole owner of the corporation. When Provident terminated Dr. Zide's benefits, he sued under California state law and alleged bad faith, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Provident alleged, among other things, that Dr. Zide's policy was governed by ERISA and that his bad faith claim was preempted.

The district court granted judgment to Provident, ruling that the insurance program was an ERISA plan and that Dr. Zide's state law claims were preempted. Applying the statutory five-factor test, the district court concluded:

  • Although there was no formal plan document apart from the insurance policy, there was an established plan, fund, or program in that the plan was a reality and not a mere promise of future potential coverage.
  • The program was established and maintained by the employer corporation: premiums were paid initially by the employer; the employer performed other ongoing administrative services, including maintaining contact with the insurer over a period of years; and the employees received a substantial discount and other benefits from the arrangement.
  • The corporation was an employer and was identified as such in the salary allotment agreement with the insurer.
  • The program provided statutory benefits (benefits in the event of disability).
  • There were participants in the program in that the program covered at least one non-owner employee of the corporation at least some point during the program's existence.

The district court also concluded that the program fell outside of the safe harbor exemption. Even though the employees bore the ultimate cost of the premiums, the availability of a discount through the efforts and commitment of the employer and which was in existence solely by virtue of the employment relationship, constituted an employer contribution to the program. Finally, the court ruled that even though the program might not satisfy all of the ERISA requirements at the time Dr. Zide filed his benefit claim -- because it no longer covered at least one non-owner employee -- the fact that the program had at one time been governed by ERISA meant that Dr. Zide's policy continued to be governed by ERISA as he continued to reap the various benefits (discounted premiums and higher levels of coverage) made available to him by the employment relationship and the employer's commitments to the insurer.

Case Study: Masteler v. Paul Revere Life Ins.

Another recent example of an individual disability insurance policy being governed by ERISA is the case of Masteler v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21725 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2012). In that case, a large national employer entered into an "employee security program" with Paul Revere whereby the insurer agreed to issue individual disability income policies to a select group of executive employees with favorable coverage options and substantial premium discounts, in exchange for the employer's promise to pay the premiums. The program was in effect for several years and multiple policies were issued to executive employees of the employer during that time. When the plaintiff applied for his policy, he represented to the insurer that his employer would pay the entire premium cost. The evidence indicated that the employer did pay the first annual premium for his policy, but several months after the policy was issued, the plaintiff left his employment. He continued the policy, agreeing to pay future premiums himself.

The plaintiff became disabled due to a heart condition and was paid benefits for several years. When benefits were about to reach the maximum pay period under the policy, the plaintiff argued that his heart condition was an injury rather than a sickness, triggering the lifetime benefit clause of the policy. The insurer disagreed, benefits were terminated, and the plaintiff sued under California state law, alleging bad faith and seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Among other things, Paul Revere argued that the policy was governed by ERISA and that the plaintiff's state law claims were preempted.

The district court agreed with Paul Revere and dismissed the plaintiff's state law complaint. The court held that where an employer enters into an agreement with an insurer to make individual disability policies available to employees at discounted premiums and higher coverage levels and pays the premiums, the employer has established an ERISA plan. The court ruled that the regulatory safe harbor did not apply because the employer paid the premium cost. Finally, the court ruled that where the employee elected to continue his coverage under the same policy and under the same terms after he left his employment, the fact that the plaintiff took over the premium payments did not remove the policy from ERISA. The plaintiff's claim was governed exclusively by ERISA and his state law claims were preempted.

Conclusion

The Zide and Masteler decisions are just a couple of examples of situations where individual insurance policies were held to be governed by ERISA. These decisions dispel the myth that only group insurance policies can be part of an ERISA plan and that individual insurance is invariably subject to state law. Of course, in order for ERISA to apply, there must be a nexus to an employment relationship, but once that nexus is established, many fact scenarios may bring individual policy coverage under ERISA and outside of state law.

Mark E. Schmidtke

Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C.

mark.schmidtke@ogletreedeakins.com

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With the preseason underway and the regular season right around the corner, football fans are gathering in front of their TVs and crowding stadiums across the country with copious amounts of food and drink watching the big game.  Legal observers will have their own action to watch although this is likely to last several seasons.    

In 2011, several former players suffering a variety of neurological disorders sued the NFL for negligence and fraud relating to whether the NFL knew and withheld that knowledge that concussions and other head injuries incurred during the playing of football could lead to long term brain damage and related side effects (no comment).  Many of these suits received class action status and were removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 

On August 13, 2012, the roster of players on this legal gridiron expanded to include the NFL’s insurance companies.  Alterra America Insurance Company, an excess insurance provider, filed suit in New York State Supreme Court in Manhattan seeking a declaratory judgment stating that Alterra
1) does not have a duty to defend the NFL against player lawsuits
2) does not have a duty to indemnify the NFL against player lawsuits

Two days later, the NFL and NFL Properties filed suit against 32 insurance companies (or nearly every major insurer in the country as reported by Reuters)  including Alterra asking the Court to require these insurers to defend and indemnify the NFL from the players’ suits.  Why so many insurers?  Because the NFL sued nearly every insurer that it has ever had regardless if a current business relationship currently exists.  This is mostly a dispute about when duty to defend triggers.  The NFL in its papers argues it’s when the injury occurs. National Football League v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance, BC490342, California Superior Court, Los Angeles County at 12.  This becomes a bit of problem because different insurers insured the NFL at different times going back to 1963. Determining which injury (if only one) caused the long term damage, when that particular injury occurred and which policy was in effect at that particular time is going to be messy to say the least. 

However, the more interesting story here takes place nearly a week later.  On August 21, Travelers’ Insurance followed “suit” and filed its own action against the NFL and the other insurance companies seeking a declaratory judgment with roughly the same arguments as Alterra.  What makes this interesting is the fine distinction that Travelers’ makes in its papers which is how the other insurance companies become involved.  

Travelers' argues that its only obligation is to NFL Properties and not to the NFL itself (both the NFL and NFL Properties have been parties to these suits).   Travelers’ argues that it never insured the NFL (whom we guess Travelers’ believes is going to take the brunt of any payout either in the form of a judgment or settlement) and therefore shouldn’t have to bear any of the NFL’s costs. Traveler’s suit against the other insurance companies is a pre-emptive strike against its peers who “may dispute Travelers’ position with respect to some or all of the foregoing matters, and make seek contribution from Travelers’ with respect to defense costs and/or indemnity paid under the policies they issued to the NFL and/or NFL Properties with respect [to the players’ law suits].” Discovery Property & Casualty Co. v. National Football League, 652933/2012, New York State Supreme Court, New York County (Manhattan) at 19.

It looks like all the players are in their respective formations… and there’s the kickoff.

[1] Ben Berkowitz, “NFL Sues Dozens of Insurers Over Player Injury Claims.“ Reuters.  08/16/12.  Accessed on 08/28/12.  Available at: http://mobile.reuters.com/article/sportsNews/idUSBRE87F0UB20120816?irpc=932.

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“Show-me-your-papers”

Posted on June 29, 2012 02:23 by Alison Y. Ashe-Card

Earlier this week, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down several key provisions of an Arizona law (SB 1070, Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act) targeting illegal immigrants, ruling the state interfered with congressional authority over U.S. borders, but it let stand a requirement that police check the immigration status of people they stop for traffic or other offenses.  Reaction by law enforcement officials in Arizona, and others, has been mixed.  Police Chief Roberto Villaseñor of Tucson said that he wonders if his agency has been dealt an “impossible mandate,” while Amy Rezzonico, spokeswoman for Arizona’s attorney general’s office said, “I’m pretty sure it will be business as usual to some degree.”  The court left open the possibility that the surviving provision could be challenged, should it lead to prolonged detentions solely to determine immigration status.  "No American should ever live under a cloud of suspicion just because of what they look like. Going forward, we must ensure that Arizona law enforcement officials do not enforce this law in a manner that undermines the civil rights of Americans, as the Court’s decision recognizes," said President Obama.

Marc Miller, a vice dean and law professor at the University of Arizona said, “By making it a mandate and lining up against the warnings of the Supreme Court, it’s created an impossibly difficult question for police and sheriffs.  Are we concerned about racial profiling? Absolutely.”  Will enforcement of this law likely result in racial profiling?  Is it fair to question one’s legal residency or U.S. citizenship simply on the basis of the color of their skin?  What impact will this law have on the Hispanic community and other minority communities?  Are the civil liberties of all Americans at risk?

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Private attorneys representing government entities are entitled to assert qualified immunity as a defense to civil rights claims, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously ruled on Tuesday in Filarsky v. Delia.  The Court’s decision allows private attorneys to rely on the same protections that their public counterparts use.


The decision reverses a ruling of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that held a private attorney could not rely on qualified immunity.

The City of Rialto, California hired a private attorney to conduct an internal affairs investigation of a firefighter taking sick leave after cleaning up a toxic spill. The firefighter’s superiors suspected that he was not ill because he had been the subject of disciplinary action immediately prior to the spill.

The firefighter claimed that he was forced to allow a warrantless inspection of his home as part of the investigation.  He sued both the City and the attorney who conducted the investigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations of his civil rights. 

Section 1983 is the enforcement arm of the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees equal protection of rights under federal and state laws, and establishes a cause of action against persons who violate constitutional rights under color of state law.

Speaking for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. cited historical examples of the protections available to persons who worked for the government when Congress passed the statute in 1871.  He concluded that the protections provide did not vary depending on whether the person worked full time or part time for the government.

“The government’s need to attract talented individuals is not limited to full-time public employees,” the Chief Justice wrote.  “Indeed, it is often when there is a particular need for specialized knowledge or expertise that the government must look outside its permanent workforce to secure the services of private individuals.”

The Court noted that the private lawyer had specialized experience in conducting internal affairs investigations, and that the City had no permanent employees with comparable qualifications. 
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The National Hockey League playoffs are underway, and the League is experiencing unprecedented media coverage as a result of the $2 billion dollar contract it signed with NBC last spring.  But with newfound popularity, comes newfound criticism, and the tensions of playoff hockey have only exacerbated the onslaught from both players and pundits.  Most of the commentary has centered on a perceived lack of consistency in officiating and enforcement, and of course, at the center of all of this is the League's concussion problem.  Last week, the League office drew heat after Nashville Predator's Defenseman Shea Weber was not suspended for deliberately slamming the head of Detroit Red Wings Forward Henrik Zetterberg into the glass.  Perhaps heeding these criticisms, the League responded this weekend with a three-game suspension for Carl Hagelin of the New York Rangers, after he elbowed the Ottawa Senators' Daniel Alfredson, causing a concussion.  Some commended the NHL for taking a tougher stance with the Hagelin suspension, but the repercussions handed down have been widely inconsistent.  Given that the League has been beset by concussion concerns with its biggest stars such as Sidney Crosby, and in light of the brewing litigation against the NFL by its former players, the NHL would do well to establish a consistent and strict policy with respect to blows to the head.

Meanwhile in the NFL, yet another concussion related lawsuit was filed Monday on behalf of four former players in Atlanta.  What makes this suit distinct from the 58 suits that have already been filed, however, is that this complaint is the first to make specific reference to "bounty-gate."  The lawsuit references the scandal as just another example of the League's indolence in dealing with the realities of head trauma. Specifically, the complaint alleges that the NFL "explicitly relied on violence" and neglected to educate players on the dangers of concussions.

Linking the bounty scandal to the ongoing concussion litigation was inevitable, but it is unlikely to be a game changer from a legal standpoint. From a public relations perspective, allegations related to bounties certainly creates a buzz, but ultimately, the scandal will offer little in the way of proving the League's negligence. First, there is little proof, at least at this point, that the League was aware of bounties occurring, and even less evidence suggesting that the problem is pervasive.  Additionally, unless the individual plaintiffs claim to have been directly affected by the scheme, the causal link is missing.  In fact, the four plaintiffs in this new suit merely state that the bounty system is indicative of a culture of violence.  But professional football is inherently violent, and without a showing that the League's policy in regards to bounty systems rendered the sport unreasonably dangerous, the allegations referencing the bounty system will do little more than draw more attention to the issue.  Regardless of the potency of these allegations, look for more suits to be filed, and expect those complaints to mirror this one.

Thank you to Brian Konkel, Law Clerk at SmithAmundsen for his work on this piece.
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Supreme Court Hears Glaxo Overtime Pay Case

Posted on April 17, 2012 05:54 by Scott Gibson

The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument Monday on the hotly questioned issue of whether pharmaceutical sales representatives are subject to the outside sales exemption under the Fair Labor Standards Act.  

The case, Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham, Corp., challenges the Ninth Circuit’s decision that sales representatives were subject to the outside sales exemption of the FLSA.  That decision conflicts with a prior decision of the Second Circuit holding that pharmaceutical sales reps are entitled to overtime compensation.

The reps – and the Department of Labor – argue that they are not subject to the exemption because they do not interact with the patients and hospitals that ultimately purchase the medications from wholesalers.  Rather, they promote medications to physicians, who write prescriptions for their patients.
The case impacts employment conditions of tens of thousands of sales representatives, and could give rise to astronomical claims for unpaid overtime compensative.  In January, for example, Novartis agreed to pay $99 million to settle a similar case after receiving an adverse ruling on appeal.
As important as the overtime issue is, the case raises a second issue that could prove to be more wide reaching in its effect, specifically, the deference owed to the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of regulations.

The Supreme Court should issue its decision in June.
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